

INVESTMENTS HELD AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER 2017

	Start Date	Maturity Date	Rate of Interest %	Amount £m
<u>FIXED DEPOSITS</u>				
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND - CD	30/10/2014	30/10/2017	1.85	40.0
STANDARD CHARTERED	02/11/2016	02/11/2017	0.88	10.0
STANDARD CHARTERED	07/11/2016	07/11/2017	0.87	10.0
BLAENAU GWENT CBC	04/12/2014	04/12/2017	1.90	3.0
LLOYDS BANK	16/04/2015	16/04/2018	1.49	30.0
LLOYDS BANK	26/05/2016	25/05/2018	1.48	10.0
GOLDMAN SACHS	02/08/2017	01/08/2018	0.93	10.0
GOLDMAN SACHS	18/08/2017	17/08/2018	0.79	5.0
GOLDMAN SACHS	19/09/2017	18/09/2018	0.95	5.0
LLOYDS BANK	19/11/2015	19/11/2018	1.82	5.0
LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL	18/12/2015	18/12/2018	1.50	10.0
LLOYDS BANK	29/07/2016	31/07/2019	1.34	2.5
PLACES FOR PEOPLE HOMES LTD	16/08/2017	16/08/2019	1.60	10.0
HYDE HOUSING ASSOCIATION	22/08/2017	22/08/2019	1.30	10.0
LLOYDS BANK	18/08/2016	19/08/2019	1.14	7.5
LLOYDS BANK	05/12/2016	05/12/2019	1.37	25.0
TOTAL FIXED DEPOSITS				193.0
<u>OTHER INVESTMENTS</u>				
STANDARD LIFE (IGNIS) LIQUIDITY FUND	25/01/2010			12.3
FEDERATED (PRIME RATE) STERLING LIQUIDITY F	15/06/2009			1.8
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	23/11/2015		0.55	10.0
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	03/08/2016		0.55	10.0
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	09/08/2016		0.55	10.0
CCLA LOCAL AUTHORITY PROPERTY FUND	30/01/2014			30.0
STANDARD LIFE - DIVERSIFIED GROWTH FUND	22/12/2014			5.0
NEWTON - DIVERSIFIED GROWTH FUND	22/12/2014			5.0
FIDELITY MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND	12/07/2017			30.0
PROJECT BECKENHAM LOAN	09/06/2017			2.3
TOTAL INVESTMENTS				309.4

APPENDIX 3

INVESTMENTS HELD AS AT 30TH SEPTEMBER 2017

	Start Date	Maturity Date	Rate of Interest %	Amount £m	Total £m	Limit £m	Remaining £m
<u>UK BANKS</u>							
LLOYDS BANK	16/04/2015	16/04/2018	1.49	30.0			
LLOYDS BANK	26/05/2016	25/05/2018	1.48	10.0			
LLOYDS BANK	19/11/2015	19/11/2018	1.82	5.0			
LLOYDS BANK	29/07/2016	31/07/2019	1.34	2.5			
LLOYDS BANK	18/08/2016	19/08/2019	1.18	7.5			
LLOYDS BANK	05/12/2016	05/12/2019	1.37	25.0	80.0	80.0	0.0
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND - CD	30/10/2014	30/10/2017	1.85	40.0	40.0	80.0	40.0
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL BANK	03/08/2016	01/08/2018	0.93	10.0			
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL BANK	18/08/2016	17/08/2018	0.79	5.0			
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL BANK		18/09/2018	0.95	5.0	20.0	20.0	0.0
STANDARD CHARTERED	02/11/2016	02/11/2017	0.88	10.0			
STANDARD CHARTERED	07/11/2016	07/11/2017	0.87	10.0	20.0	30.0	10.0
<u>LOCAL AUTHORITIES</u>							
BLAENAU GWENT CBC	04/12/2014	04/12/2017	1.90	3.0	3.0	15.0	12.0
LANCASHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL	18/12/2015	18/12/2018	1.50	10.0	10.0	15.0	5.0
<u>HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS</u>							
PLACES FOR PEOPLE HOMES LTD	04/12/2014	16/08/2019	1.60	10.0	10.0	10.0	0.0
HYDE HOUSING ASSOCIATION	18/12/2015	22/08/2019	1.30	10.0	10.0	10.0	0.0
<u>OTHER INVESTMENTS</u>							
STANDARD LIFE (IGNIS) LIQUIDITY FUND	25/01/2010			12.3	12.3	15.0	2.7
FEDERATED (PRIME RATE) STERLING LIQUIDITY F	15/06/2009			1.8	1.8	15.0	13.2
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	23/11/2015		0.55	10.0			
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	03/08/2016		0.55	10.0			
SANTANDER (180 DAYS CALL ACCOUNT)	09/08/2016		0.55	10.0	30.0	30.0	0.0
CCLA LOCAL AUTHORITY PROPERTY FUND	30/01/2014			30.0			
STANDARD LIFE - DIVERSIFIED GROWTH FUND	22/12/2014			5.0			
NEWTON - DIVERSIFIED GROWTH FUND	22/12/2014			5.0			
FIDELITY MULTI-ASSET INCOME FUND	12/07/2017			30.0	70.0	80.0	10.0
PROJECT BECKENHAM LOAN	09/06/2017			2.3	2.3	2.3	0.0
TOTAL INVESTMENTS				309.4	309.4		

Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

Mid-year Review Report 2017/18

1 Background

The Council operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

Accordingly, treasury management is defined as:

“The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

2 Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2011) was adopted by this Council on 20th February 2012.

The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

1. Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
2. Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
3. Receipt by the full council of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy - for the year ahead, a **Mid-year Review Report** and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
4. Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
5. Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Executive and Resources PDS Committee:

This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:

- An economic update for the first part of the 2017/18 financial year;

- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- The Council's capital expenditure (prudential indicators);
- A review of the Council's investment portfolio for 2017/18;
- A review of the Council's borrowing strategy for 2017/18;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2017/18;
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2017/18.

Key Changes to the Treasury and Capital Strategies

As detailed in section 3.5.2 of the covering report, it is proposed that the Investment Strategy be amended with an increase to the limit for pooled investment schemes from £80m to £100m.

3 Economic update (provided by Link Asset Services)

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently, in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid

wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.

- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.2% (+2.0% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.6% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting MPC. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in September and is expected to rise slightly in the coming months.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of

the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 -34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EU. Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.5% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y), 0.6% in quarter 2 (2.3% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.5% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in October inflation was 1.4%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

USA. Growth in the American economy was notably erratic and volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.0%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.2%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with four increases in all and three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017, which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four increases in 2018. At its September meeting, the Fed said it would start in October to gradually unwind its \$4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess

industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

4 Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy update

The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2017/18 was approved by this Council on 1st March 2017. A subsequent revision was approved by Council on 26th June 2017, which included the following changes to the strategy:

- Inclusion of a secured loan that helps deliver the Council's housing objectives;
- An increase to the limit for pooled investment schemes to £80m;
- A reduction to the counterparty rating criteria for Housing Associations to A-;
- A temporary increase in the counterparty limit with Lloyds bank.

5 Investment Portfolio

In accordance with the Code, it is the Council's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with the Council's risk appetite. As shown by forecasts in section 3, it is a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in line with the current 0.50% Bank Rate. The continuing potential for a re-emergence of a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and its impact on banks, prompts a low risk and short term strategy. Given this risk environment and the fact that increases in Bank Rate are likely to be gradual and unlikely to return to the levels seen in previous decades, investment returns are likely to remain low.

Details of the Council's investment activity during the first six months of 2017/18 are provided in sections 3.2.2 to 3.4.5 of the covering report and lists of current investments are provided in Appendices 3 (in maturity date order) and 4 (by counterparty). The Council held £309.4m of investments as at 30th September 2017 (£292.3m as at 30th June 2017).

The Director of Finance confirms that the approved limits within the Annual Investment Strategy were not breached during the first six months of 2017/18.

The Council's budget for interest on investments in 2017/18 is £2.891m, which is based on an assumed interest rate of 0.90% for new investments. As a result of the higher interest rates being earned on new investments made on recent investments as well as higher levels of balances available for investment, a surplus of £500k is currently projected for the 2017/18 financial year.

Investment Counterparty criteria

The current investment counterparty criteria selection approved in the TMSS is meeting the requirement of the treasury management function.

6 Borrowing

The Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2017/18 is £2.3m. The CFR denotes the Council's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The Council does not currently borrow to finance its capital expenditure and has, in recent years, only had to borrow short-term (for cashflow purposes) on a very few occasions.

No borrowing is currently anticipated during this financial year, but it is possible that some may be required in future years to fund the property purchases related to Opportunity Site G, which would be repaid from the capital receipts from the scheme.

Prudential and Treasury Indicators – Mid-Year Review 2017/18

The old capital control system was replaced in April 2004 by a prudential system based largely on self-regulation by local authorities themselves. At the heart of the system is The Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities, developed by CIPFA. The Code requires the Council to set a number of prudential indicators designed to monitor and control capital expenditure, financing and borrowing. The indicators for 2017/18 were approved by Council in March 2017 and this Annex sets out the actual performance against those indicators in the first six months, updating them where necessary. Prudential and Treasury Indicators are relevant for the purposes of setting an integrated treasury management strategy.

The Council is required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. This original 2001 Code was adopted by the full Council in February 2002 and the revised 2011 Code was initially adopted by full Council in February 2012.

Prudential Indicators for Capital Expenditure

This table shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure and the changes since the Capital Programme for 2017/18 was agreed in March 2018. The decrease in the latest estimate for 2017/18 is mainly the result of slippage in expenditure originally planned for 2017/18 into future years, as highlighted in previous reports to the Executive and to PDS Committees.

Capital Expenditure by Portfolio	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
Education	32.9	22.5
Renewal & Recreation	4.6	6.1
Environment	15.0	16.4
Care Services	11.2	7.9
Resources	23.3	19.1
Public Protection & Safety	-	-
Less: estimated slippage	-10.0	-7.5
Total	77.0	64.5

Changes to the Financing of the Capital Programme

The table below draws together the main strategy elements of the capital expenditure plans (above), highlighting the original supported and unsupported elements of the capital programme, and the expected financing arrangements of this capital expenditure.

Capital Expenditure	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
Supported	77.0	64.5
Unsupported	-	-
Total spend	77.0	64.5
Financed by:		
Capital receipts	7.4	24.7
Capital grants/contributions	49.7	36.6
General Fund	-	-
Revenue contributions	19.9	3.2
Total financing	77.0	64.5
Borrowing need	-	-

Changes to the Prudential Indicators for the Capital Financing Requirement, External Debt and the Operational Boundary

It is a statutory duty for the Council to determine and keep under review the “Affordable Borrowing Limits”, which comprise external / internal borrowing and other long-term liabilities, mainly finance leases. The Council’s approved Treasury and Capital Prudential Indicators (affordability limits) are outlined in the approved TMSS. The table below shows the expected “worst case” debt position over the period. This is termed the Operational Boundary. Bromley has an operational “borrowing” limit (Operational Boundary) of £30m, although in practice, this limit is never in danger of being breached.

The Authorised Limit, which represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited, is another of the prudential indicators and needs to be set and revised by Members. It reflects the level of borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. It is the expected maximum borrowing need with some headroom for unexpected movements. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003 and, for Bromley, this figure has been set at £60m.

The table also shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose. The Council’s capital financing requirement (CFR) as at 1st April 2017 was £3.1m. If the CFR is positive, the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The Council’s CFR relates to liabilities arising from finance leases entered into in recent years in respect of various items of plant and equipment. The Council currently has no external borrowing as such.

Prudential Indicators	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
CFR	2.2	2.3
Debt – Operational Boundary		
Borrowing	10.0	10.0
Other long-term liabilities	20.0	20.0
Total Operational Boundary	30.0	30.0
Debt – Authorised Boundary		
Borrowing	30.0	30.0
Other long-term liabilities	30.0	30.0
Total Operational Boundary	60.0	60.0

Other Prudential Indicators

Other indicators designed to control overall borrowing and exposures to interest rate movements are included in the summary table below, which will require the approval of full Council.

Prudential and Treasury Indicators - Summary

	2017/18	2017/18
	Original Estimate	Revised Estimate
Total Capital Expenditure	£77.0m	£67.0m
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	0.0%	0.0%
Net borrowing requirement (net investments for Bromley)		
brought forward 1 April	£255.0m	£269.9m
carried forward 31 March	£241.1m	£246.7m
in year borrowing requirement (reduction in net investments for Bromley)	-£13.9m	-£23.2m
Estimated CFR as at 31 March (finance lease liability) (NB. Actual CFR as at 31 March 2017 (finance lease liability) = £3.1m)	£2.2m	£2.3m
Annual change in Cap. Financing Requirement	-£0.6m	-£0.5m
Incremental impact of capital investment decisions	£ p	£ p
Increase in council tax (band D) per annum	-	-

TREASURY MANAGEMENT INDICATORS	2017/18 Original Estimate	2017/18 Revised Estimate
Authorised Limit for external debt -		
borrowing	£30.0m	£30.0m
other long term liabilities	£30.0m	£30.0m
TOTAL	£60.0m	£60.0m
Operational Boundary for external debt -		
borrowing	£10.0m	£10.0m
other long term liabilities	£20.0m	£20.0m
TOTAL	£30.0m	£30.0m
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable rate exposure	20%	20%
Upper limit for total principal sums invested beyond year-end dates	£170.0m	£170.0m